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detailed	rules	for	its	implementation,	and	starting	the	process	of	strengthening	Parties’	climate	protection	contributions.	The	year	2018	provided	ample	evidence	that	global	climate	change	is	already	here:	Devastating	extreme	heat	and	unprecedented	drought	in	large	parts	of	North	America	and	Europe,	wildfires	in	California	and	Scandinavia,	severe	floods	in	East	Africa,	rare	tropical	cyclones	in	Somalia,	Djibouti,	Yemen	and	Oman,	and	a	record	breaking	tropical	cyclone	season.	At	the	same	time,	scientific	knowledge	about	the	impacts	of	climate	change	and	the	options	to	avoid	the	worst	impacts	was	never	more	prominent.	A	special	report	by	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)1	and	the	latest	edition	of	UN	Environment’s	annual	emission	gap	report2	reiterated	that	the	contributions	countries	have	so	far	pledged	are	far	away	from	what	would	be	necessary	to	achieve	the	objectives	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	While	the	Agreement	has	the	aim	to	keep	global	temperature	increase	compared	to	pre-industrial	levels	well	below	2°C	and	to	make	best	efforts	to	stay	below	1.5°C,	current	pledges	would	lead	to	a	warming	of	3-4°C	by	the	end	of	this	century.	Global	emissions	are	continuing	to	rise,	with	2018	marking	a	new	record	year.	In	this	context,	many	had	hoped	that	the	conclusion	of	the	“Talanoa	Dialogue”,	a	process	to	identify	options	for	enhanced	mitigation	ambition	(see	more	below),	would	bear	fruit	already	in	Katowice.	However,	none	of	the	major	emitting	countries	was	ready	to	step	up.	Climate	ambition,	it	seems,	is	desperately	lacking	in	the	capitals	of	the	world,	not	to	mention	those	places	like	the	United	States	and	Brazil	where	nationalist	governments	have	started	to	roll	back	even	the	existing	insufficient	level	of	climate	action.	The	atmosphere	in	Katowice	was	further	marred	by	the	heavy	crackdown	by	the	host	nation’s	government	on	civil	society	activists.	Against	this	backdrop,	to	the	surprise	of	many,	COP24	concluded	late	on	15	December	2018	with	the	adoption	of	the	“Katowice	Climate	Package”.3	This	set	of	decisions	operationalizes	the	2015	Paris	Agreement	by	setting	out	detailed	guidelines	on	how	to	implement	its	various	elements,	in	particular	how	countries	are	to	develop	and	report	on	their	nationally	determined	contributions	(NDCs),	that	is,	their	pledges	for	how	they	will	contribute	to	combating	climate	change.	Other	key	elements	are	financial	support	for	developing	countries	and	the	procedures	for	conducting	the	first	‘Global	Stocktake’	for	assessing	the	effectiveness	of	global	climate	action	in	2023.	These	guidelines	are	more	robust	than	many	had	dared	to	expect	at	the	start	of	the	conference.	Nonetheless,	their	adoption	is	no	more	than	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	The	most	important	aspect	of	the	Katowice	outcome	is	therefore	that	it	has	brought	the	wrangling	about	implementation	procedures	largely	to	a	close,	making	way	for	the	true	task	at	hand:	the	strengthening	of	national	and	international	activities	to	protect	the	climate	and	the	implementation	of	the	existing	pledges.	
II. More Speed Required – Raising Ambition  The	Paris	outcome	requires	the	Parties	to	the	Paris	Agreement	to	produce	new	or	updated	contributions	by	2020.	Given	the	lack	of	climate	ambition	most	countries	have	shown	so	far,	the		
1 IPCC, ‘Special Report. Global Warming of 1.5 ºC. An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above 
pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global 
response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2018) <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/> accessed 25 March 2019 
2 UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2018  (United Nations Environment Programme 2018) 
3 UNFCCC, ‘Katowice Climate Change Conference – December 2018’, (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, n.d.) <https://unfccc.int/katowice> accessed 25 March 2019 
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question	in	Katowice	was	whether	the	conference	would	send	a	strong	signal	on	the	need	for	all	countries	to	strengthen	their	contributions.	While	Article	4.3	of	the	Paris	Agreement	mandates	that	NDCs	should	reflect	a	Party’s	“highest	possible	ambition”,	many	Parties	disputed	that	the	2020	round	of	re-submitting	NDCs	entailed	a	requirement	to	increase	ambition.	To	inform	the	process	until	2020,	Parties	conducted	the	so-called	‘Talanoa	Dialogue’	parallel	to	the	formal	diplomatic	negotiations	over	the	course	of	2018.	‘Talanoa’	is	a	concept	introduced	by	the	Fijian	presidency	of	the	2017	climate	conference	and	denotes	an	open	sharing	of	views.	The	process	ultimately	concluded	in	Katowice	with	the	‘Talanoa	Call	for	Action’,	which	calls	upon	all	countries	and	stakeholders	to	act	with	urgency.4	The	process	also	produced	a	synthesis	report	of	all	the	inputs	received	and	discussions	held	over	the	course	of	the	year.5	One	key	input	to	the	Talanoa	Dialogue	was	the	IPCC’s	special	report	on	the	1.5°C	warming	limit	laid	down	in	the	Paris	Agreement.	The	report	concludes	that	“every	bit	of	warming	matters”,	as	IPCC	representatives	explained	at	the	conference.	Whether	global	warming	is	kept	below	1.5°C	or	only	below	2°C	will	make	a	huge	difference	for	humans	and	ecosystems.	In	addition,	the	report	assesses	emission	pathways	for	achieving	these	temperature	limits.	To	maintain	a	good	chance	of	staying	below	1,5°C,	global	emissions	will	essentially	need	to	be	halved	by	2030	and	be	reduced	to	net	zero	by	2050.	However,	the	USA,	Saudi	Arabia,	Russia	and	Kuwait	caused	substantial	delays	and	aggravation	by	refusing	to	adopt	a	decision	with	language	to	“welcome”	the	report.	Saudi	Arabia	argued	that	they	could	not	welcome	the	report	as	it	contained	substantial	open	questions	and	uncertainties.	Ultimately,	Parties	resolved	to	welcome	the	report’s	“timely	completion”	and	“invited”	countries	to	make	use	of	the	report	in	their	further	work.	However,	the	decision	also	“recognises	the	role	of	the	IPCC	in	providing	scientific	input	to	inform	Parties	in	strengthening	the	global	response	to	the	threat	of	climate	change”	and	refers	to	the	special	report	as	“reflecting	the	best	available	science.”6	On	the	whole,	the	decision	therefore	confirms	the	status	of	the	IPCC	and	the	special	report.	As	the	Talanoa	Dialogue	ran	in	parallel	to	the	diplomatic	negotiations,	the	question	was	how	its	outcome	would	be	reflected	in	the	formal	conference	decisions.	In	this	regard,	instead	of	a	strong	call	to	increase	ambition,	delegates	decided	to	merely	“take	note”	of	the	dialogue’s	outcome,	input	and	outputs,	and	to	invite	Parties	“to	consider	the	outcome,	inputs	and	outputs	of	the	Talanoa	Dialogue	in	preparing	their	nationally	determined	contributions	and	in	their	efforts	to	enhance	pre-2020	implementation	and	ambition”.7	This	non-committal	language	is	compensated	to	some	extent	by	other	parts	of	the	decision,	which	reaffirm	the	need	for	ambitious	efforts	to	achieve	the	objectives	of	the	Paris	Agreement	and	stress	the	urgency	of	enhancing	ambition.8	In	addition,	the	decision	refers	to	the	special	summit	the	UN	Secretary-General	is	convening	in	2019	as	a	place	for	demonstrating	enhanced	ambition.	Almost	comical,	though,	is	the	formulation	that	Parties		
4 UNFCCC, ‘Announcement, Join the Talanoa Call for Action’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 12 
December 2018) <https://unfccc.int/news/join-the-talanoa-call-for-action> accessed 25 March 2019 
5 ‘Talanoa Dialogue for Climate Ambition, Synthesis of the Preparatory Phase, 19/11/2018’ 
<https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cu4u95lo_238771.pdf> accessed 
25 March 2019 
6 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.24, Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 
(Advance version 19 March 2019) paras 24-28 
7 ibid paras 35-37 
8 ibid para 14 
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demonstrate	their	ambition	already	through	their	participation	in	that	event.9	Parties	need	to	do	their	homework	first.		COP24	thus	clearly	failed	in	its	task	to	urgently	call	on	Parties	to	increase	their	mitigation	ambition.	In	terms	of	public	messages,	however,	the	“media	tsunami”	created	by	the	controversy	on	whether	or	not	to	“welcome”	the	IPCC	report	may	have	compensated	for	the	lack	of	strong	language	in	the	COP	decision.10		
III. Moving Paris out of the Drydock – The Rulebook The	Paris	Agreement	established	the	objectives	and	basic	mechanisms	of	international	climate	policy	for	the	time	after	2020,	but	still	required	more	detailed	technical	rules	on	how	to	implement	its	various	aspects,	e.g.	on	how	Parties	are	supposed	to	report	on	the	actual	realisation	of	their	contributions	in	order	to	ensure	comparability	of	the	various	efforts	made.	The	Paris	conference	had	established	a	work	programme	to	develop	these	rules,	which	the	Katowice	conference	was	supposed	to	finish.	Despite	three	years	of	negotiations,	delegates	arrived	in	Katowice	with	many	unresolved	issues,	embodied	in	236	pages	of	texts	that	included	many	alternative	options	and	nearly	3,000	square	brackets	indicating	areas	of	disagreement.11	Whether	it	would	be	possible	to	reduce	the	number	of	brackets	and	options	to	zero	was	very	much	an	open	question.	Divisions	were	still	sharp	at	the	end	of	the	first	week	and	UN	Secretary-General	Guterres	himself	was	engaged	three	times	on	site	to	help	bridge	the	divides.	Once	again,	the	key	cross-cutting	issue	was	differentiation:	whether	the	same	rules	should	apply	to	all	Parties,	or	whether	different	rules	should	apply	to	the	traditional	groups	of	“developed”	and	“developing”	countries.	
1. Rowing Instructions – The NDC Guidelines  One	of	the	key	elements	of	the	implementation	guidelines	of	the	Paris	Agreement	are	further	specifications	with	respect	to	the	key	vehicle	of	climate	action:	the	nationally	determined	contributions	(NDCs)	that	Parties	have	to	revise	or	update	regularly	to	communicate	their	climate	action	targets	and	policies.	In	the	run-up	to	the	Paris	conference,	Parties	had	failed	to	agree	on	a	common	format	and	information	requirements	for	what	were	then	still	“intended”	NDCs.12	As	result,	there	is	a	broad	range	of	different	types	of	NDCs	and	the	information	provided	in	the	NDCs	is	hardly	comparable.	To	address	this	issue,	Parties	had	requested	the	Ad	Hoc	Working	Group	on	the	Paris	Agreement	(APA)	to	develop	guidance	for	the	information	to	be	provided	by	Parties	to	facilitate	clarity,	transparency	and	understanding	of	NDCs	as	well	as	guidance	for	the	accounting	of	NDCs.13		
	
9 ibid paras 49f. 
10 Jennifer Iris Allan, Beate Antonich, Jennifer Bansard, Katherine Browne, Natalie Jones and Mari Luomi, ‘Summary of the 
Katowice Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2018’ (2018) 12(747) ENB 
<http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12747e.html> accessed 25 March 2019 
11 Simon Evans and Jocelyn Timperley, ‘COP24: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Katowice’ (Carbon Brief, 16 
December 2018) <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop24-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-katowice> accessed 
25 March 2019 
12 Wolfgang Sterk, Christof Arens, Nicolas Kreibich, Lukas Hermwille Florian Mersmann and Timon Wehnert, Warsaw 
Groundhog Days – Old Friends, Positions and Impasses Revisited All Over Again at the 2013 Warsaw Climate Conference 
(Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 2013) <http://wupperinst.org/en/info/details/wi/a/s/ad/2447/> 
accessed 21 March 2019 
13 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) paras 28 
and 31 respectively 
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In	correspondence	with	the	first	mandate		Parties	agreed	to	a	list	of	information	requirements	that	will	be	only	applicable	for	the	second	round	NDCs,	but	Parties	are	also	“strongly	encouraged”	to	apply	them	for	updates	of	the	first	NDCs	that	are	taking	effect	as	of	2020.14	The	information	requirements	include:	
• information on the reference point of the target; 
• timeframe and implementation period; 
• the scope (what gases and what sectors are covered?); 
• the planning process; 
• assumptions and methodologies; 
• considerations of how the NDC is fair and ambitious; 
• and how the NDC contributes to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. Especially	noteworthy	is	that	countries	are	obligated	to	explain	their	rationale	of	why	they	consider	their	contribution	equitable.	This	is	particularly	relevant	because	many	of	the	current	NDCs	fail	to	meet	the	required	ambition	-	no	matter	what	kind	of	equity	rationale	is	applied.15	Notable	is	also	what	ultimately	was	not	agreed:	earlier	drafts	included	also	information	requirements	on	adaptation,	finance,	technology,	and	capacity	building.	Many	developing	countries	had	demanded	that	the	NDCs	should	be	“full	scope”	and	cover	all	of	these	elements,	while	developed	countries	had	argued	that	the	NDCs	should	focus	on	mitigation.	While	these	elements	are	not	excluded	from	the	NDCs,	there	is	also	no	requirement	to	include	these	aspects	in	the	next	NDCs.	The	second	task	was	to	provide	guidelines	for	Parties	on	how	to	report	progress	on	the	implementation	of	NDCs	(also	see	Transparency	Framework).16	Of	course,	the	first	task	–	to	properly	define	contributions	–	is	essential	for	tracking	progress.	On	that	basis,	Parties	are	now	required	to	follow	IPCC	guidelines	for	accounting	GHG	emissions	or	explicate	their	methodology	if	they	have	opted	for	targets	that	cannot	be	assessed	with	existing	IPCC	approved	methodologies.		The	NDC	guidelines	will	not	do	away	with	the	fact	that	the	world	will	continue	to	compare	apples	and	oranges	as	countries	will	most	likely	continue	to	express	their	climate	ambitions	in	very	different	metrics.	Yet	the	guidelines	adopted	in	Katowice	will	enable	us	to	much	better	understand	each	individual	piece	of	fruit.	
2. Planning for Heavy Weather – Adaptation Communication  According	to	the	Paris	Agreement,	Parties	“should	(...)	submit	and	update	periodically	an	adaptation	communication,	which	may	include	its	priorities,	implementation	and	support	needs,	plans	and	actions”.17	Adaptation	communications	are	not	only	to	increase	the	visibility	and	profile	of	adaptation,	but	also	to	strengthen	adaptation	action	and	support	for	developing	countries,	enhance	learning	and	understanding	of	adaptation	needs	and	actions,	and	provide		
14 UNFCCC ‘Decision 4/CMA.1, Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21, Annex I, Information to 
facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined contributions, referred to in decision 1/CP.21’ UN 
Doc FCCC//PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (Advance version 19 March 2019) para. 28 
15 See for example the assessments in the Climate Action Tracker, <https://climateactiontracker.org> accessed 21 March 2019 
16 UNFCCC ‘Decision 4/CMA.1, Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21, Annex II, Accounting 
for Parties’ nationally determined contributions, referred to in decision 1/CP.21’ UN Doc FCCC//PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 
(Advance version 19 March 2019) para 31 
17 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 55 ILM 740 Art 7.10 
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input	to	the	Global	Stocktake	(see	below).	Guidance	on	adaptation	communications	allows	for	a	better	understanding	and	options	for	aggregation	of	information	on	plans	and	progress	in	global	adaptation	efforts.	While	COP	21	had	not	provided	a	mandate	to	develop	guidance	for	adaptation	communications,	Parties	agreed	to	add	guidance	on	adaptation	communication	to	the	APA	agenda	and	the	development	of	modalities	and	procedures	for	the	adaptation	registry	to	the	Subsidiary	Body	for	Implementation	(SBI)’s	agenda	at	APA	1	in	May	2016.	Both	items	became	part	of	the	work	programme	under	the	Paris	Agreement	at	COP	22.	In	Katowice,	one	of	the	discussions	focused	on	the	purpose	and	principles	for	the	guidance.	While	several	developing	countries	wanted	the	guidance	to	include	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities	(CBDR-RC),	providing	differentiation	of	guidance	for	developing	and	industrialised	countries’	adaptation	communications,	developed	countries	opposed.18	The	final	text	does	not	differentiate	guidance	for	the	content	of	adaptation	communications.	Application	of	the	guidance	is	voluntary,	however,	and	Parties	decided	that	adaptation	communication	is	“country-driven	and	flexible,	including	in	the	choice	of	communication	or	document”.19	Adaptation	communications	shall	not	impose	any	additional	burden	on	developing	country	Parties,	nor	be	used	for	country	comparisons,	nor	be	subject	to	a	review.	In	its	final	decision,	the	CMA	invited	Parties	to	provide	in	their	adaptation	communication	information	on	elements	such	as	national	circumstances,	adaptation	priorities,	strategies,	policies,	plans,	goals	and	action	as	well	as,	inter	alia,	support	needs,	and	implementation	of	adaptation	actions	and	plans.20	Following	corresponding	suggestions	by	developing	country	Parties,	the	CMA	finally	decided	to	take	stock	of,	and	if	necessary,	revise	the	guidance	on	adaptation	communications	at	CMA	8	(2025).21	Adaptation	communications	shall	be	recorded	in	a	public	registry	together	with	the	public	registry	for	NDCs	managed	by	the	Secretariat.22	While	the	guidance	for	adaptation	communications	outlines	a	common	structure,	application	of	the	guidance	is	voluntary,	leaving	it	up	to	every	country	how	to	report	on	progress	achieved	and	the	gaps	remaining.	Depending	on	the	structure	countries	will	finally	choose	for	their	adaptation	communications,	this	may	well	complicate	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat’s	efforts	to	provide	an	overview	of	adaptation	communications	and	aggregate	information.	Nevertheless,	adoption	of	the	guidance	is	an	important	milestone	for	achieving	adaptation	goals,	including	required	climate	finance.	
3. Logging Progress – The Transparency Framework  The	“Enhanced	Transparency	Framework	for	Action	and	Support”	can	be	considered	a	cornerstone	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	It	sets	the	rules	by	which	countries	are	to	report	on	their		
18 Allan et al. ‘Summary’ (n. 10). 
19 UNFCCC ‘Decision 9/CMA.1, Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a 
component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement’ UN 
Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (Advance version) 19 March 2019) para 2 
20 ibid. Annex 
21 ibid. para 16 
22 ibid., para 5; see also UNFCCC ‘Decision 10/CMA.1, Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry 
referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (Advance version 19 
March 2019) para 3 
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GHG	emissions	and	progress	towards	implementing	their	NDCs,	and	it	establishes	international	processes	to	review	and	assess	the	reports.	While	basic	provisions	had	been	agreed	in	Paris,	Parties	had	requested	the	APA	to	develop	recommendations	for	common	modalities,	procedures	and	guidelines	with	a	view	to	adoption	by	the	CMA	at	its	first	session.23			In	Katowice,	the	key	question	was	how	to	establish	a	reporting	system	for	all	Parties	while	at	the	same	time	providing	flexibility	to	developing	countries	with	capacity	constraints.	This	question	of	differentiation	clearly	separated	developed	countries	from	the	larger	emerging	economies:	China	and	some	other	developing	countries	pushed	for	a	system	with	separate	reporting	rules	for	developing	and	developed	countries,	striving	for	a	continuation	of	the	current	reporting	system	under	the	Convention.	The	United	States	and	other	developed	Parties,	in	contrast,	envisaged	a	system	with	common	reporting	rules	for	all	Parties	with	only	limited	flexibility	for	developing	countries.			It	was	only	after	very	intense	negotiations	and	a	move	by	China	abandoning	its	previous	stance	that	Parties	in	Katowice	succeeded	in	overcoming	the	“bifurcation”	of	the	existing	reporting	system	and	introduced	common	reporting	rules	applicable	to	all	countries.	Establishing	a	uniform	reporting	system	had	been	one	of	the	key	priorities	for	the	negotiators	from	the	United	States.	Despite	President	Trump’s	announcement	to	withdraw	from	the	Paris	Agreement,	US	diplomats	maintained	their	strong	position.24	Ultimately,	Parties	reached	a	compromise	by	making	flexibility	provisions	for	developing	countries	with	limited	capacities	operational,	a	concept	that	had	already	been	introduced	with	the	Paris	Agreement.	The	agreed	modalities,	procedures	and	guidelines25	for	the	Transparency	Framework	supersede	the	existing	UNFCCC	transparency	system	for	Parties	to	the	Paris	Agreement.	They	require	all	countries	from	2024	onwards	to	biennially	submit	greenhouse	gas	inventories,	provide	information	on	the	progress	towards	meeting	their	NDC	as	well	as	other	types	of	information.	Notably,	Parties	will	also	have	to	report	on	potential	transfers	of	mitigation	outcomes	and	how	these	transfers	are	accounted	for.	These	minimum	requirements	are	to	safeguard	the	environmental	integrity	of	market-based	cooperation	under	Article	6	(see	section	5	below).	When	submitting	this	information,	developing	countries	with	limited	capacities	are	allowed	to	deviate	from	the	uniform	rules	in	specific	areas.	The	application	of	this	flexibility	may	relate	to	the	scope,	frequency	and	level	of	detail	for	reporting	and	is	to	be	self-determined.	Countries	deviating	from	the	uniform	rules	are	required	to	indicate	relevant	capacity	constraints	as	well	as	the	time	needed	for	overcoming	the	barriers	encountered.	However,	contrary	to	what	the	US	had	demanded	there	is	no	firm	time	limit	on	this	flexibility.	While	the	focus	of	the	Transparency	Framework	is	climate	change	mitigation,	it	also	gathers	information	relevant	for	the	areas	of	climate	change	impacts	and	adaptation,	which	is	to	be	submitted	by	Parties	on	a	non-mandatory	basis.	In	addition	to	this	reporting	on	climate	action,	the	Transparency	Framework	compiles	information	on	support	for	addressing	climate	change		
23 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (n. 13) para 91 and Paris Agreement (n. 17) Art. 13.13 
24 Jeff Godell, ‘Saving the Paris Agreement, How a team of U.S. diplomats helped salvage the global pact on climate change in 
the face of Trump’s denialism’ (Rolling Stone, 18 January 2019) <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
features/saving-the-paris-agreement-780473/> accessed 15 March 2019 
25 UNFCCC ‘Decision 18/CMA.1, Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support 
referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Annex, Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency 
framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC//PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 
(Advance version 19 March 2019) 
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and	its	impacts,	such	as	financial	support.	With	regard	to	financial	support	provided,	only	developed	countries	are	required	to	submit	such	information.	Similarly,	information	on	support	needed	and	received	by	developing	countries	is	only	gathered	on	a	non-mandatory	basis.	Parties	in	Katowice	also	agreed	on	how,	when	and	by	whom	the	information	biennially	provided	by	Parties	is	to	be	reviewed	and	assessed.	Two	processes	have	been	detailed:	In	the	technical	expert	reviews	the	consistency	of	the	reports	is	checked	against	the	provisions	of	the	Transparency	Framework	and	areas	of	improvement	are	highlighted.	In	line	with	the	bottom-up	spirit	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	assessing	the	appropriateness	of	a	Party’s	NDC	and	the	adequacy	of	domestic	actions,	however,	are	explicitly	not	within	the	mandate	of	these	reviews.	A	second	process	is	the	facilitative,	multilateral	consideration	of	progress,	in	which	Parties	exchange	questions	and	answers	in	both	writing	and	in	a	workshop	format.	This	process	is	modelled	after	the	multilateral	assessments	of	the	biennial	reports	from	developed	countries	and	the	facilitative	sharing	of	views	on	the	biennial	update	reports	from	developing	countries	that	exist	under	the	pre-Paris	transparency	framework.		
4. The Pacemaker – The Global Stocktake  In	order	to	comply	with	the	aim	to	keep	global	temperature	increase	well	below	2°C	and	to	make	best	efforts	to	stay	below	1.5°C,	Parties	need	to	urgently	ramp	up	their	mitigation	ambition.	In	this	regard,	the	Global	Stocktake	is	key	–	it	is	supposed	to	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	increasing	ambition	over	time.	As	of	2023,	this	process	will	periodically	(every	5	years)	assess	collective	progress	of	the	Parties	towards	the	goals	of	the	agreement.	This	assessment,	in	turn,	is	supposed	to	inform	national	governments	in	developing	their	subsequent	NDCs.26		As	requested27	in	the	decisions	to	give	effect	to	the	Paris	Agreement,	Parties	adopted	modalities	for	the	Global	Stocktake	in	Katowice.	These	modalities	now	foresee	three	phases28:	information	collection	and	preparation,	technical	assessment	and	a	political	phase	of	the	“consideration	of	outputs”.	The	work	will	focus	on	three	“thematic	areas”	–	mitigation,	adaptation,	and	means	of	implementation	and	support.	Notably	and	after	substantial	controversies,	Parties	agreed	to	open	the	process	to	also	consider	loss	and	damage	associated	with	the	adverse	effects	of	climate	change.	Critically	discussed	was	furthermore	the	question	of	how	equity	considerations	are	to	be	reflected	in	the	Global	Stocktake.	Article	14.1	of	the	Paris	Agreement	stipulates	that	the	Global	Stocktake	be	conducted	in	the	light	of	equity	and	the	reference	to	equity	usually	refers	to	the	principle	of	differentiated	responsibilities.	References	to	equity	now	also	feature	prominently	at	various	paragraphs	of	the	corresponding	modalities	for	the	Global	Stocktake.	But	what	is	still	missing	is	a	concrete	idea	of	how	a	consideration	of	equity	could	be	operationalized	in	practice.		Another	major	bone	of	contention	was	whether	and	to	what	degree	the	Global	Stocktake	is	open	to	non-party	stakeholders,	observers	and	the	public.	On	that	matter,	Parties	decided	that	the	Global	Stocktake	will	be	“conducted	in	a	transparent	manner	and	with	the	participation	of	non-	
26 For a detailed analysis of the elements required for the Global Stocktake to fully unfold its catalytic potential see Lukas 
Hermwille and Anne Siemons. What Makes an Ideal Global Stocktake? A Functional Analysis, Discussion Paper 22/2018 
(Umweltbundesamt 2018) <http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/what-makes-an-ideal-global-stocktake-a-
functional> accessed 21 March 2019 
27 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (n. 13) para 101 
28 UNFCCC ‘Decision 19/CMA.1, Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99–101 of decision 
1/CP.21’ UN Doc FCCC//PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (Advance version 19 March 2019) 
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Party	stakeholders”.29	Opportunities	for	participation	include	to	provide	written	submissions	as	input	to	the	Global	Stocktake	and	to	participate	in	the	technical	dialogue	that	is	supposed	to	be	undertaken	by	means	of	”in-session	round	tables,	workshops	or	other	activities.”30	The	extent	to	which	non-Party	stakeholders	can	actively	participate,	though,	will	be	dependent	on	how	the	two	co-facilitators	choose	to	organize	the	technical	dialogue.		There	were,	however,	also	worrying	aspects	concerning	the	participation	of	stakeholders.	The	decision	specifies	that	the	inputs	will	be	made	“fully	accessible	by	Parties“	(emphasis	added)31.	While	this	formulation	does	not	explicitly	exclude	that	the	inputs	will	be	publicly	available,	the	phrase	still	caused	some	concern	among	observers	that	the	Global	Stocktake	could	end	up	being	a	rather	secretive	endeavour.	This,	of	course,	would	contradict	the	purpose	of	the	Global	Stocktake:	to	foster	a	constructive	debate	on	ambitious	climate	action	and	to	(re)align	national	political	agendas	for	the	subsequent	NDCs	with	the	goals	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	To	this	end,	inclusive	and	extensive	stakeholder	engagement	is	absolutely	essential.	




29 ibid para 10 
30 ibid. para 6 
31 ibid. paras 10 and 21 
32 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (n. 13) paras 36-40 
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Negotiations	at	COP	24	started	optimistically	when	the	Independent	Alliance	of	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(AILAC),33	Australia,	Canada,	the	European	Union,	Japan,	Mexico,	New	Zealand	and	Switzerland	submitted	a	joint	proposal	on	the	need	for	corresponding	adjustments	when	transferring	mitigation	outcomes	under	Article	6.	These	adjustments	are	in	the	view	of	many	–	both	scholars34	and	Parties	–	a	necessary	precondition	for	robust	accounting	and	for	avoiding	any	kind	of	double	counting.		Yet	this	momentum	did	not	last	long.	At	the	beginning	of	week	two,	Parties	had	covered	numerous	issues	regarding	guidance	for	the	cooperative	approaches	in	Art.	6.2	as	well	as	elements	for	the	rules,	modalities	and	procedures	of	the	mechanism	according	to	Art.	6.4.	However,	the	text	was	full	of	options	and	brackets.	Moreover,	as	had	already	become	clear	in	the	Bangkok	session	some	months	earlier,	a	substantial	number	of	technical	questions	would	need	to	be	resolved	the	following	year.		Towards	the	end	of	the	conference,	it	became	clear	that	the	issue	of	corresponding	adjustments	could	become	a	deal	breaker.	Mainly	Brazil,	but	also	the	Arab	Group	strongly	and	continuously	opposed	respective	language	on	safeguarding	environmental	integrity	and	transparent	reporting.	Yet	the	absence	of	corresponding	adjustments	would	not	only	have	created	accounting	loopholes	for	the	Paris	Agreement,	it	could	also	have	led	to	double	counting	of	mitigation	outcomes	authorized	by	Parties	for	use	towards	fulfilling	other	international	mitigation	obligations,	e.g.	under	the	International	Civil	Aviation	Organization.		Despite	compromise	proposals	by	the	Presidency,	the	controversies	lasted	well	into	the	last	day	plus	one	of	the	conference.	When	still	no	common	ground	could	be	found,	the	complete	text	was	taken	back	on	Saturday	afternoon	and	the	Art.	6	rulebook	decisions	were	deferred	in	their	entirety	to	future	sessions.	The	CMA	called	upon	SBSTA	to	build	negotiations	on	different	text	versions	used	in	Katowice	in	order	to	finalize	deliberations	by	COP	25	in	2019.35	However,	within	the	Transparency	Framework	(Art.	13	of	the	PA),	Parties	were	able	to	agree	on	minimum	requirements	to	safeguard	environmental	integrity	of	Art.	6	transfers:	the	respective	decision36	requires	all	Parties	that	would	like	to	transfer	mitigation	outcomes	to	report	on	corresponding	adjustments	of	their	NDC,	no	matter	if	used	towards	an	NDC	or	for	purposes	other	than	achievement	of	NDCs.	The	latter	refers	to	schemes	like	the	Carbon	Offsetting	and	Reduction	Scheme	for	International	Aviation	(CORSIA)	established	by	the	International	Civic	Aviation	Organisation,	which	plans	to	use,	inter	alia,	credits	generated	under	Art.	6	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	Further	reporting	requirements	for	Art.	13	comprise	information	on	sustainable	development	promotion,	environmental	integrity	and	transparency.		As	a	result,	integrity	risks	associated	with	double	counting	were	successfully	hedged,	while	detailed	decisions	on	how	to	govern	the	PA’s	Article	6	were	shelved	for	2019.			
33 The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean is a Party group established in December 2012 during the 
Conference of the Parties in Doha, Qatar. It comprises the following countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru 
34 See, inter alia, Nicolas Kreibich and Lukas Hermwille, Robust Transfers of Mitigation Outcomes - Understanding 
Environmental Integrity Challenges (Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy 2016); Michael Lazarus, Anja 
Kollmuss and Lambert Schneider, Single-Year Mitigation Targets: Uncharted Territory for Emissions Trading and Unit 
Transfers (Stockholm Environment Institute 2014); Lambert Schneider, Anja Kollmuss and Michael Lazarus, Addressing the 
Risk of Double Counting Emission Reductions under the UNFCCC (Stockholm Environment Institute 2014) 
35 UNFCCC ‘Decision 8/CMA.1, Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 36–40 of decision 1/CP.21’ 
UN Doc FCCC//PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (Advance version 19 March 2019) paras 1-2.  
36 UNFCCC ‘Decision 18/CMA.1’ (n. 25) para 77 (d). 
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6. Dealing with Weak Performance – Implementation and Compliance  Article	15.1	of	the	Paris	Agreement	establishes	a	mechanism	to	facilitate	implementation	of	and	promote	compliance	with	its	provisions.	Article	15.2	furthermore	stipulates	that	this	mechanism	“shall	consist	of	a	committee	that	shall	be	expert-based	and	facilitative	in	nature	and	function	in	a	manner	that	is	transparent,	non-adversarial	and	non-punitive.”	In	the	decision	adopting	the	Paris	Agreement,	Parties	requested	the	APA	to	develop	modalities	and	procedures	for	the	effective	operation	of	this	committee.37		According	to	the	modalities	and	procedures	adopted	in	Katowice,38	the	Committee	will	consist	of	12	members	with	two	of	them	drawn	from	each	of	the	five	geographical	regions	plus	one	from	the	small	island	developing	states	and	one	from	least	developed	countries.	The	procedure	is	the	result	of	many	compromises:	on	the	one	hand,	it	is	of	a	facilitative	nature,	emphasizing	support	and	co-operation	and	without	providing	any	punitive	or	forcible	measures	to	the	Committee.	On	the	other	hand,	the	procedure	can	be	triggered	by	the	Committee	itself	without	the	consent	of	the	Party	concerned	in	cases	where	a	country	fails	to	comply	with	binding	information	requirements.	In	other	cases,	for	example	if	information	provided	appears	to	be	inconsistent,	the	Committee	will	only	be	able	to	commence	proceedings	with	the	consent	of	the	respective	Party.		Interesting	from	a	legal	point	of	view,	the	procedure	deviates	from	the	general	consensus	requirement	in	the	climate	regime	in	that	it	allows	for	decisions	to	be	taken	by	a	three-fourths	majority	of	members	present	and	voting	if	all	efforts	to	reach	consensus	have	been	exhausted.	Measures	that	can	be	imposed	are	not	punitive	and	confined	to	providing	advice,	assisting	in	the	appropriation	of	financial	support	or	the	recommendation	to	develop	an	action	plan.	The	Committee	may	also	on	its	own	provide	recommendations	regarding	issues	of	a	“systemic	nature”,	thus	providing	it	with	a	truly	advisory	role.	And	finally,	the	Committee	may	seek	and	receive	information	from	processes,	bodies,	arrangements	and	forums	under	or	serving	the	Paris	Agreement.	
IV. Building Team Capacity – Support for the Global South 
1. Finance  Financial	support	for	developing	countries’	climate	action	has	been	a	hotly	contested	issue	for	years.	Crucial	questions	include	not	only	the	level	of	support,	but	also	the	definition	of	what	constitutes	climate	financing	and	how	both	the	level	of	resources	provided	by	developed	countries	and	their	use	in	developing	countries	should	be	reported.	Following	the	respective	mandate	given	in	Paris,39	a	process	to	identify	the	respective	information	to	be	provided	by	Parties	was	initiated	at	COP	22.40	While	finance	had	been	a	crucial	bone	of	contention	in	earlier	sessions,	negotiations	on	this	issue	in	Katowice	progressed	rapidly.	As	expected,	the	final	text	only	includes	relatively	permissive	rules,	providing	developed	countries	with	great	flexibility	on	what	and	how	to	report	on	climate		
37 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (n. 13) para 103 
38 Decision ‘20/CMA.1, Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate implementation and 
promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement’, UN Doc FCCC//PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 
(Advance version 19 March 2019) 
39 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (n. 13) para 55 
40 UNFCCC ‘Decision 13/CP.22, Initiation of a process to identify the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with 
Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement. UN Doc FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1 (31 January 2017) 
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finance:	Developed	country	Parties	shall	biennially	communicate	indicative	quantitative	and	qualitative	information	on,	inter	alia,	projected	levels	of	public	financial	resources	to	be	provided	to	developing	country	Parties.	Other	Parties	providing	resources	are	encouraged	to	do	so	on	a	voluntary	basis.41	Countries	may	not	only	report	grants,	equity	and	guarantees	as	climate	finance,	but	also	concessional	and	non-concessional	loans.	Reporting	of	grant-equivalent	values	remains	voluntary.	This	provides	great	leeway	for	developed	countries	on	accounting	of	financial	support.	Furthermore,	the	final	decision	does	not	require	climate	finance	to	be	new	and	additional,	but	only	asks	countries	to	provide	information	of	what	new	and	additional	financial	resources	have	been	provided.	Synthesis	reports,	workshops,	and	ministerial	meetings	will	evaluate	finance	information	and	their	sufficiency.42	One	year	earlier,	at	COP23	in	Bonn,	an	important	decision	on	the	future	architecture	of	international	climate	financing	had	been	taken:	The	Adaptation	Fund,	originally	set	up	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	will	come	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Paris	Agreement	in	the	future.	This	means	that	the	continued	existence	of	this	important	fund	is	secured	in	the	future.	As	the	proceeds	from	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	have	all	but	come	to	a	standstill,	the	Adaptation	Fund	has	had	to	rely	on	voluntary	contributions	from	developed	countries	for	years.	In	Katowice,	Parties	decided	that	the	Adaptation	Fund	shall	be	financed	from	the	Paris	Agreement’s	Art.	6.4	mechanism’s	share	of	proceeds	as	well	as	from	voluntary	public	and	private	sources.	Furthermore,	the	Fund	shall	serve	the	Paris	Agreement	under	the	guidance	of,	and	be	accountable	to,	the	CMA	from	1	January	2019,	with	a	full	transition	after	Art.	6.4	has	become	operational.43	As	for	the	volume	of	finance,	so	far,	developed	countries’	contributions	do	not	yet	amount	to	the	at	least	USD	100	billion	of	climate	finance	for	developing	countries	per	year	from	2020	which	they	had	agreed	to	provide	in	previous	COP	decisions.	However,	several	financial	announcements	were	made	in	Katowice	(see	below).	Furthermore,	as	mandated	in	Paris,44	at	COP24,	Parties	set	up	a	process	starting	in	2020	to	define	a	new,	increased,	collective	quantified	goal	for	climate	finance	from	202545.	For	the	period	between	2015	and	2018,	the	Green	Climate	Fund	has	so	far	only	received	nearly	USD	7	billion	of	the	USD	10.2	billion	pledged	to	it	in	2014,	caused	both	by	the	US’s	withdrawal	from	its	previous	commitments	and	changes	in	exchange	rates.	The	first	replenishment	round	of	the	Fund	was	launched	in	October	2018.	Germany	already	pledged	EUR	1.5	billion46	(USD	1.7	billion)47	and	Norway	USD	516	million	to	the	Fund48,	both	doubling	their	previous		
41 UNFCCC ‘Decision 12/CMA.1, Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, 
paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (Advance version 19 March 2019) 
42 UNFCCC ‘Decision 18/CMA.1’ (n. 25) section V 
43 UNFCCC ‘Decision 13/CMA.1 Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund’ UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (Advance 
version 19 March 2019) 
44 UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21’ (n. 13) para 53 
45 UNFCCC ‘Decision 14/CMA.1 Setting a new collective quantified goal on finance in accordance with decision 1/CP.21, 
paragraph 53’ UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (Advance version 19 March 2019) 
46 BMZ ‘Schulze und Müller in Kattowitz: Deutschland verdoppelt Zusage für internationalen Klimafond’. Press release 
03.12.2018 <http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2018/dezember/181203_pm_057_Deutschland-verdoppelt-
Zusage-fuer-internationalen-Klimafonds/index.html> accessed 25 March 2019 
47 Exchange rate used: EUR 1 = USD 1.14 (30 January 2019) 
48 Evans and Timperley, ‘COP24: Key outcomes’ (n. 11) 
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contributions.49	Japan	announced	considering	raising	its	contribution	after	the	official	start	of	the	replenishment	in	2019.	Furthermore,	more	than	USD	129	million	were	pledged	to	the	Adaptation	Fund	at	COP	24,	with	Germany	alone	making	a	contribution	of	EUR	70	million	(USD	80	million).	
2. Loss and Damage  With	the	integration	of	“loss	and	damage”	under	Article	8	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	the	most	vulnerable	countries	had	achieved	an	important	step	towards	the	recognition	of	the	fact	that	there	are	climate	change	induced	impacts	that	cannot	be	adapted	to.	In	Katowice,	the	key	question	was	in	which	areas	and	how	the	issue	of	loss	and	damage	should	be	reflected	in	the	rulebook.	Developing	countries	were	pushing	to	include	loss	and	damage	in	diverse	negotiation	areas,	with	the	Transparency	Framework,	the	Global	Stocktake	and	finance	being	particularly	relevant.	Developed	countries,	in	contrast,	wary	about	claims	for	financial	compensation,	mainly	wanted	the	issue	to	be	subsumed	under	adaptation.		In	the	end,	Parties	were	able	to	find	some	common	ground	by	including	the	issue	of	loss	and	damage	in	several	sections	of	the	rulebook,	including	the	Transparency	Framework	and	the	Global	Stocktake.50	Despite	the	rather	weak	language,	this	can	be	considered	a	significant	step	forward.	The	inclusion	of	loss	and	damage	under	the	Transparency	Framework	will	allow	countries	to	report	on	how	they	have	been	impacted	by	climate	change	in	the	past,	what	impacts	they	expect	to	be	confronted	with	in	the	future	and	how	they	intend	to	deal	with	them,	as	well	as	the	support	needed.	With	loss	and	damage	also	being	part	of	the	Global	Stocktake,	there	is	now	an	official	process	to	collect	and	process	this	data.	This	success	clearly	contrasts	with	the	role	of	loss	and	damage	in	the	area	of	climate	finance.	Here,	there	is	no	explicit	reference	to	this	topic,	keeping	financial	support	confined	to	the	areas	of	mitigation	and	adaptation.	In	Katowice,	Parties	also	approved	the	Report	by	the	Executive	Committee	of	the	Warsaw	International	Mechanism	(WIM),	the	body	to	address	loss	and	damage	associated	with	impacts	of	climate	change	that	had	been	established	at	the	last	Polish	COP	in	2013.	After	a	first	review	of	the	mechanism	in	2016	in	Marrakesh,	Parties	had	agreed	on	a	more	rigorous	review	of	the	WIM	to	be	undertaken	in	2019.	Parties	and	other	stakeholders	are	invited	to	submit	their	views	and	input	by	1	February	2019	on	possible	elements	to	be	included	in	the	review.	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	this	review	will	be	able	to	strengthen	the	role	of	the	WIM	and	highlight	the	relevance	of	additional	support,	including	in	finance,	for	addressing	loss	and	damage.		
V. The Polish Presidency  In	the	run-up	to	the	conference,	having	Poland	as	host	and	president	of	COP24	had	raised	numerous	concerns	as	Poland	has	traditionally	often	tried	to	stall	progress	on	climate	policy.51	Prior	to	the	conference,	COP	President	Kurtyka	had	advocated	for	a	“realistic”	and	“pragmatic”	approach,	criticising	calls	to	have	ambition	raising	as	a	key	issue	at	the	conference,	In	addition,	Poland	had	adopted	special	legislation	against	demonstrations,	so	it	was	feared	that	the	country	would	crack	down	hard	on	civil	society	activism.	The	latter	fears	were	confirmed	when	Poland		
49 Green Climate Fund ‘GCF replenishment wins strong endorsement at COP24’ (13 December 2018) 
<https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/gcf-replenishment-wins-strong-endorsement-at-cop24> accessed 25 March 2019 
50 See UNFCCC ‘Decision 18/CMA.1, Annex’ (n. 25) para 115 and UNFCCC ‘Decision 19/CMA.1’ (n. 28) 
51 For example, Poland was the only EU member state that vetoed adoption of a long-term low-carbon roadmap in 2012, see 
Dave Kearting, ‘Poland blocks EU’s low-carbon roadmap’ (Politico, 10 March 2012) <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-
blocks-eus-low-carbon-roadmap/> accessed 25 March 2019 





VI. Tug Boats – Pioneer Alliances and Non-Party Actors The	Paris	Agreement	explicitly	acknowledges	the	role	of	non-state	and	subnational	actors.	And	in	fact	the	engagement	of	non-state	and	subnational	actors	has	been	increasing	significantly	in	recent	years.	UNEP	records	that	more	than	7,000	cities,	245	regions,	along	with	more	than	6,000	companies	have	pledged	mitigation	action	which	cover	some	17%	of	the	global	population	and	economic	activities	accruing	at	least	US$36	trillion	in	revenue.53	The	current	contribution	to	mitigating	emissions	beyond	what	countries	pledged	in	their	NDCs	is	limited	–	some	0.2-0.7	Gt	GtCO2e	per	year	by	2030	over	fully	implemented	NDCs	and	1.5-2.2	GtCO2e	per	year	compared	to	current	policy.	The	potential	impact,	however,	is	considered	to	be	much	larger	if	those	initiatives	are	scaled	up	across	the	covered	sectors	(3.7	–	19	GtCO2e	per	year	compared	to	current	policy).54	
	
52 COP24 Presidency, ‘Key Initiatives of the Polish Presidency’ (n.d.) <https://cop24.gov.pl/presidency/initiatives/> accessed 25 
March 2018 
53 UNEP, Bridging the Emissions Gap - The Role of Non-State and Subnational Actors  (United Nations Environment Programme 
2018); UNFCCC, Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2018  (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2018) 
54 ibid UNEP Non-State and Subnational Actors  
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The	key	event	for	non-state	and	subnational	actors	in	2018	was,	however,	not	COP24	in	Katowice,	but	the	Global	Climate	Action	Summit	hosted	by	California’s	Governor	Jerry	Brown	in	September	in	San	Francisco.	More	than	4000	representatives	from	non-state	and	subnational	actors	convened,	discussed	climate	action	strategies	and	presented	their	own	commitments.	Perhaps	the	most	far	reaching	announcement	of	that	summit	was	California’s	own	commitment	to	achieve	fossil	free	energy	supply	by	the	end	of	2045.	Phasing	out	fossil	fuel	consumption	for	California,	a	state	that	would	be	the	fifth	largest	economy	of	the	world	if	it	was	independent	and	that	is	not	only	heavily	dependent	on	fossil	fuel	consumption	but	still	produces	oil	and	gas,	is	an	extremely	ambitious	feat.		But	non-state	and	subnational	actors	continued	to	receive	attention	also	at	COP24,	inter	alia	by	participating	in	the	Talanoa	Dialogue	(see	above).	A	total	of	473	submissions	were	collected,	about	a	third	of	which	originated	from	subnational	governments,	private	sector	organisations	or	hybrid	partnerships	and	coalitions.55	But	the	COP	was	also	again	used	as	a	platform	to	highlight	new	commitments	by	several	actors:	The	World	doubled	its	pledge	for	climate	finance	for	the	time	period	from	between	2021	and	2025	to	USD	200	billion,	USD	50	billion	of	which	are	reserved	for	adaptation	and	resilience.	Kristalina	Georgieva,	the	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	the	World	Bank,	announced	that	the	World	Bank	will	consider	climate	change	in	all	its	work	and	use	a	shadow	carbon	price	in	its	economic	valuations.56	Also	other	banks	(ING,	BBVA,	BNP	Paribas,	Société	Générale	and	Standard	Chartered)	responsible	for	EUR	2.4	tn	(USD	2.7	tn)	of	loans	declared	to	steer	their	lending	portfolios	towards	being	compatible	with	“well	below	2°C”.	Likewise,	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(EBRD)	announced	a	new	energy	sector	strategy	that	emphasises	the	scaling-up	of	investment	in	renewables	and	excludes	financing	for	coal	infrastructure,	but	fails	to	meet	the	standards	of	the	World	Bank	which	in	a	previous	announcement	had	ruled	out	financing	for	any	upstream	fossil	fuel	investments.57		But	announcements	were	not	limited	to	the	financial	sector.	The	global	shipping	giant	Maersk	pledged	to	become	climate	neutral	by	2050	and	fully	transform	to	carbon	neutral	fuels	and	supply	chains.	To	this	end	the	company	called	for	carbon	neutral	vessels	to	be	commercially	viable	by	2030.	Together	with	the	recent	developments	at	the	level	of	the	International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	there	finally	seems	to	be	some	movement	in	a	sector	that	has	dramatically	lagged	behind	in	the	recent	past.	Additionally,	the	Powering	Past	Coal	Alliance,	founded	at	COP23	and	committed	to	the	phase-out	of	coal,	has	attracted	many	new	members	and	now	comprises	30	nation	states,	22	subnational	governments	and	regions	plus	28	business	actors.58	To	conclude,	many	non-state	and	subnational	actors	display	a	tremendous	level	of	ambition	in	combatting	climate	change.	This	provides	an	important	undercurrent	to	support	global	climate	action.	Not	only	can	non-state	actors	to	some	extent	make	up	for	the	ambition	gap	that	national	governments	left	in	their	current	NDCs.	More	importantly	even,	non-state	and	subnational	actors	can	play	an	important	role	in	supporting	the	implementation	of	the	NDCs	and	creating	a	socio-political	environment	that	can	spur	ambition	in	subsequent	NDCs.			
55 UNFCCC ‘Updated Overview of inputs into the Talanoa Dialogue’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
26 November 2018) <https://talanoadialogue.com/outputs-and-outcome> accessed 25 March 2019 
56 World Bank, ‘World Bank Group Announces $200 billion over Five Years for Climate Action, Press release’ (World Bank, 
03.12.2018) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/12/03/world-bank-group-announces-200-billion-over-
five-years-for-climate-action> accessed 25 March 2019  
57 Evans and Timperley ‘COP24: Key outcomes’ (n. 11) 
58 Powering Past Coal Alliance Declaration <https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/canada-
international-action/coal-phase-out/alliance-declaration.html> accessed 21 March 2019 
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But	is	also	important	to	note	that	engaging	and	orchestrating	non-state	and	subnational	actors	is	not	a	silver	bullet.59	To	realize	its	full	potential,	the	global	action	agenda	of	non-state	and	subnational	actors	needs	to	be	integrated	more	closely	with	the	international	negotiations	and	national	policy-making.	In	Katowice,	again	the	activities	from	non-state	and	subnational	actors	ran	mostly	in	parallel	to	the	intergovernmental	negotiations	in	a	separate	area	of	the	conference	venue.	To	create	positive	feedback	loops	and	to	bring	in	the	positive	momentum	from	non-state	actors	more	immediate	connections	need	to	be	built.60	For	example,	the	contribution	of	non-state	and	subnational	actors	should	be	considered	systematically	in	the	Global	Stocktake.	The	mandate	of	the	Global	Stocktake	in	principle	provides	space	for	this.	Another	opportunity	is	to	involve	them	at	the	national	level	in	participatory	process	towards	developing	and	updating	NDCs.61	
VII. Lookout – Conclusions and Outlook  
1. High Expectations, Low Results? The	assessment	of	COP24	must	necessarily	come	to	a	mixed	conclusion.	On	the	one	hand,	the	UNFCCC	process	once	more	failed	to	deliver	what	it	set	out	to	deliver,	i.e.	mobilising	action	at	a	scale	that	is	sufficient	to	prevent	dangerous	climate	change.	A	strong	call	for	action	was	missing	despite	the	steady	drumbeat	of	scientific	warnings	and	mounting	climate	impacts.	On	the	other	hand,	COP24	delivered	a	sound	technical	result	with	the	adoption	of	the	rulebook	and	thus	fulfilled	the	other	half	of	the	expectations.	However,	it	bears	noting	that	the	United	Nations	are	a	negotiating	platform	of	sovereign	states,	not	a	centralized	world	government.	Negotiators	always	have	to	refer	back	to	their	national	capitals	before	making	any	concessions	on	their	positions.	International	conferences	can	therefore	only	rarely	take	decisions	that	have	not	previously	been	prepared	nationally.	This	is	true	in	particular	for	the	climate	regime,	which	is	characterized	by	the	constraint	to	move	forward	by	consensus.	Since	1994	Saudi	Arabia	has	blocked	any	attempt	to	agree	on	Rules	of	Procedure	that	include	voting	by	a	three-fourths	majority	if	all	efforts	at	reaching	consensus	have	failed.	As	we	have	analyzed	previously,	the	climate	regime	is	thus	delivering	on	two	important	goals,	namely	providing	significance	and	legitimation	for	climate	policies.	It	has	severe	difficulties,	however,	to	reach	agreement	on	the	allocation	of	scarce	resources	like	the	atmosphere.62	Given	recent	rollbacks	in	key	countries,	in	particular	the	US	and	Brazil,	the	adoption	of	robust	implementation	guidelines	for	the	Paris	Agreement	is	therefore	not	a	small	achievement.	It	sends	a	signal	that	the	global	community	is	still	able	to	come	to	a	multilateral	agreement	on	the	procedural	way	forward,	and	that	the	vast	majority	of	countries	still	sees	climate	change	as	a	major	concern.	It	helped,	of	course,	that	the	US	has	a	genuine	interest	in	sound	rules	and	thus	was	rather	supportive.	China,	on	the	other	hand,	deviated	to	some	extent	from	its	former	position	that	
	
59 For a critical assessment of the potential and limits of non-state actors see Sander Chan, Idil Boran, Harro van Asselt, 
Gabriela Iacobuta, Navam Niles, Katharine Rietig, Michelle Scobie, et al. ‘Promises and Risks of Nonstate Action in Climate 
and Sustainability Governance’ (2019) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, January, e572 
60 Lukas Hermwille, ‘Making Initiatives Resonate: How Can Non-State Initiatives Advance National Contributions under the 
UNFCCC?’ (2018) 18/3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 447 
61 Sander Chan, Paula Ellinger and Oscar Widerberg, ‘Exploring National and Regional Orchestration of Non-State Action for a 
<1.5 °C World’ (2018) 18/1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1 
62 Lukas Hermwille, Wolfgang Obergassel, Hermann E. Ott, and Christiane Beuermann ‘UNFCCC Before and After Paris – 
What’s Necessary for an Effective Climate Regime?’ (2015) 17/2 Climate Policy 150 
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any	scrutiny	of	its	performance	would	amount	to	a	violation	of	its	sovereignty.	This	is	no	small	step	and	paves	the	way	for	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	to	take	on	a	leadership	role.	
2. Logbook – Duty for all Seafarers In	result,	the	Katowice	conference	once	and	for	all	bridged	the	traditional	bifurcation	of	“developed”	and	“developing”	countries.	Starting	in	2024,	countries	will	have	to	report	on	their	emissions	and	on	their	actions	according	to	common	rules	every	two	years.	For	developing	countries	with	limited	capacities,	the	rulebook	provides	flexibility	regarding	the	scope,	frequency,	and	level	of	detail	of	reporting.	Countries	making	use	of	this	option	will	however	need	to	explain	why	they	require	this	flexibility	and	provide	self-determined	time	frames	to	improve	reporting.	Additional	flexibility	applies	to	LDCs	and	SIDS.	In	return	for	developing	countries	agreeing	to	common	rules,	developed	countries	agreed	to	provide	more	transparency	on	climate	finance	and	to	start	discussions	on	a	new	collective	finance	goal	in	2020.	Another	win	for	developing	countries	was	the	decision	that	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	Adaptation	Fund	will	in	the	future	serve	the	Paris	Agreement.	These	institutional	decisions	were	supported	by	successful	replenishment	of	the	GCF	and	the	AF.	The	mandate	for	the	implementation	and	compliance	committee	is	also	stronger	than	may	have	been	expected.	While	the	Paris	Agreement	explicitly	gives	only	a	facilitative	role	to	the	committee,	it	now	has	a	mandate	to	independently	initiate	consideration	of	non-compliance	in	certain	cases.	The	committee	may	furthermore	on	its	own	consider	if	a	country	has	not	communicated	or	maintained	an	NDC,	has	not	submitted	its	transparency	report,	or,	in	the	case	of	a	developed	country,	its	indicative	finance	report.	The	negotiation	results	also	provided	a	solid	basis	for	a	Global	Stocktake	that	is	successful	in	catalysing	ambition.	Parties	decided	that	substantial	time	will	be	dedicated	to	the	process.	Non-Party	stakeholders	may	participate	by	making	submissions	and,	in	principle,	in	roundtables	or	workshops.	Whether	or	not	the	Global	Stocktake	will	become	a	success	will	be	crucially	determined	by	the	way	the	co-facilitators	choose	to	set	up	the	process.		Finally,	the	conference	failed	to	adopt	decisions	on	Article	6.	This	omission	weighs	heavy	considering	that	Parties	may	transfer	mitigation	outcomes	under	Article	6.2	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	there	is	international	guidance.	This	hole	in	the	rulebook	should	therefore	quickly	be	plugged	in	order	to	safeguard	the	environmental	integrity	of	the	Agreement.	
3. Raising Ambition Nonetheless,	the	adoption	of	the	guidelines	only	prepares	the	framework	for	the	real	work	to	come,	namely	real	reductions.	Only	a	handful	of	countries	announced	in	Katowice	that	they	were	going	to	strengthen	their	contributions,	including	India,	Canada,	Ukraine	and	Jamaica.	Germany	made	a	particularly	poor	showing,	having	to	admit	in	a	stocktake	of	pre-2020	action	that	it	was	going	to	miss	its	2020	emission	target	by	a	wide	margin.	Germany	had	also	contributed	to	stymying	a	push	by	the	European	Commission	to	strengthen	the	EU’s	2030	target.	Germany	could	have	made	a	positive	contribution	by	communicating	the	phase-out	plan	for	coal	consumption	and	production,	but	the	delay	of	the	“coal	commission”	that	was	tasked	to	prepare	that	plan	led	to	yet	another	lost	opportunity	for	climate	leadership.	With	the	negotiations	on	the	Paris	implementation	guidelines	(mostly)	out	of	the	way,	it	is	now	possible	to	focus	on	the	task	of	raising	ambition.	As	UN	Secretary-General	Guterres	put	it	in	a	statement	read	out	in	the	COP	plenary	after	the	deal	had	been	adopted,	“From	now	on	my	five	
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priorities	will	be	ambition,	ambition,	ambition,	ambition	and	ambition.”63		To	this	end,	he	is	convening	a	special	summit	on	climate	change	in	2019.	This	summit	and	the	ongoing	process	under	the	UNFCCC	will	hopefully	help	to	galvanise	national	discussions	on	stepping	up	climate	ambition.	Several	dozen	countries	from	the	“High	Ambition	Coalition”	that	had	formed	at	the	Paris	conference	pledged	to	“step	up”	their	ambition	until	2020	by	enhancing	their	NDCs,	increasing	short-term	action,	and	adoption	of	long-term	low-emission	development	strategies.64	However,	it	bears	noting	that	the	coalition	has	so	far	only	constituted	and	re-constituted	itself	to	save	the	UN	climate	process.	Now	that	the	work	of	agreeing	rules	is	mostly	complete,	what	is	needed	is	rather	an	action	coalition	committed	to	making	actual	emission	cuts.	It	would	thus	make	sense	to	form	the	High	Ambition	Coalition	into	something	more	stable	in	order	to	influence	the	process	throughout	the	year,	not	just	in	the	final	days	of	a	make-it-or-break-it	COP.	COP24	thus	has	proven	that	the	consensus-based	process	in	the	climate	regime	can	deliver	common	rules	for	assessing,	monitoring	and	reporting	of	information.	This	is	no	small	achievement	because	a	sound	information	base	is	indispensible	for	any	serious	action.	But	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	Paris	Agreement	can	fulfil	the	hopes	put	on	it	when	adopted	in	Paris	–	that	it	is	able	to	engage	all	countries	in	a	process	that	leads	to	reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	fast	enough	to	keep	the	world	on	a	safe	path.	
4. Barriers and Prospects for Action Arguably,	a	key	factor	that	has	been	slowing	down	climate	policy	is	the	power	of	entrenched	interests.	Transition	research	has	coined	the	term	“socio-technical	regime”	to	describe	the	currently	dominant	way	of	delivering	societal	needs	such	as	food,	housing,	mobility	etc.	The	regime	is	characterised	and	stabilised	by	rules	that	are	cognitive	(e.g.	belief	systems,	guiding	principles,	goals,	innovation	agendas,	problem	definitions,	search	heuristics),	regulative	(e.g.	standards,	laws)	and	normative	(e.g.	values,	roles,	behavioural	norms)	and	shared	by	the	relevant	actors	of	a	regime	(governments,	companies,	civil	society,	scientists	etc.).	Crucially,	policymakers	and	incumbent	firms	often	form	a	core	alliance	at	the	regime	level,	oriented	towards	maintaining	the	status	quo.65	This	mechanism	is	illustrated	for	example	by	the	current	diesel	scandals,	where	German	policymakers	are	refusing	to	crack	down	on	German	carmakers	even	though	those	have	fragrantly	broken	the	law.	Transitions	may	take	place	when	there	are	instabilities	on	the	regime-level,	caused	by	tensions	between	the	regime	and	its	environment	or	learning	and	adaptation	processes	at	the	regime-level	itself.	These	tensions	create	windows	of	opportunity	for	a	niche	to	become	more	powerful	and	to	replace	the	“old”	regime.	“In	the	end,	transitions	are	structural	regime	transformations,	in	which	regime	actors	will	ultimately	need	to	change	along	with	the	process	or	fall	out	of	the	system“.66	 	
63  Karl Mathiesen, Megan Darby and Sara Stefanini, ‘Countries breathe life into the Paris climate agreement’,(Climate Home 
News, 15 December 2018) <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/12/15/countries-breathe-life-paris-climate-
agreement/> accessed 25 March 2019 
64 European Commission, ‘COP24: EU and allies in breakthrough agreement to step up ambition’, (European Commission, 12 
December 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop24-eu-and-allies-breakthrough-agreement-step-ambition_en 
65 Frank W. Geels , ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon transitions: introducing politics and power into the multi-level 
perspective’ (2014) Theory, Cult. Soc.  31/5 21 
66 Derk Loorbach , Transition Management: New Mode of Governance for Sustainable Development, PhD Dissertation, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam  (International Books 2007) 294 
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Factors	that	may	contribute	to	destabilising	the	incumbent	regime	are	for	example	outside	events	such	as	climate	change	impacts,	advances	in	alternative	technologies	and	practices,	or	internal	tensions	created	by	failing	to	sufficiently	deliver	on	societal	needs	–	such	as	tackling	climate	change.	Usually,	these	factors	reinforce	each	other,	with	increasing	viability	of	alternative	solutions	making	it	easier	to	re-orient	policy	towards	normative	pressure.67	One	may	note	relevant	developments	in	all	of	these	dimensions.	Climate	impacts	are	being	felt	all	across	the	globe.	While	the	traditional	industrialised	countries	had	long	operated	under	the	assumption	that	climate	impacts	were	mostly	an	issue	for	developing	countries,	events	such	as	the	record	Central	European	drought	in	the	summer	of	2018	are	increasingly	dispelling	that	notion.	However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	and	when	the	mounting	impacts	will	contribute	to	galvanising	action.	Advances	in	alternative	technologies	and	practices	are	continuing	apace.	Renewable	wind	and	solar	electricity	are	increasingly	cost	competitive	not	only	with	new	fossil	fuel	installations	but	also	with	old,	written-off	ones.68	Shifts	within	the	regime	can	be	identified	in	the	shifts	of	international	organisations	like	the	World	Bank,	private	finance	institutions	and	global	companies	like	Maersk,	as	discussed	in	section	VI.	In	addition,	social	dissatisfaction	with	the	current	pace	of	climate	policy	is	manifesting	itself	in	developments	like	the	divestment	movement	or	the	“school	strike	for	climate”	movement	that	seems	to	be	taken	off.	Having	started	with	the	individual	protest	of	Swedish	16-year-old	Greta	Thunberg,	school	strikes	have	in	the	meantime	spread	to	a	number	of	countries	including	Australia,	Belgium	and	Germany.	In	the	USA,	the	newly	emerged	“Sunrise	Movement”	is	working	to	make	climate	change	an	urgent	priority	in	the	2020	elections.	Another	emerging	trend	is	citizens	launching	court	cases	against	their	governments.	The	most	successful	case	has	so	far	been	the	Urgenda	case	in	the	Netherlands,	which	forced	the	Dutch	government	to	strengthen	its	climate	policy.	The	case	and	the	debate	surrounding	it	also	contributed	to	the	Netherlands	emerging	as	a	climate	frontrunner,	which	is	now	calling	on	its	fellow	EU	members	to	strengthen	the	EU’s	2030	emission	target	from	-40%	to	-55%.	Several	cases	have	also	been	brought	against	Germany	and	the	European	Union,	where	farmers	and	others	dependent	on	a	sound	climate	system	litigate	for	stronger	climate	action.	On	the	other	hand,	while	some	complain	about	the	lack	of	strong	climate	policy,	others	complain	about	there	being	too	much	of	it.	Two	prominent	examples	in	this	regard	are,	first,	Donald	Trump	who	campaigned	on	a	platform	of	reviving	the	fossil	fuel	industry,	and,	second,	the	“yellow	vest”	protests	in	France,	which	were	sparked	by	carbon	taxation.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	better	take	into	account	the	various	impacts	of	climate	policies.	While	there	are	many	synergies	with	other	sustainability	goals,	such	as	cleaner	air,	there	are	also	trade-offs,	such	as	energy	price	increases	and	job	losses	in	emission-intensive	industries.	Parties	should	therefore	heed	the	call	in	the	preamble	of	the	Paris	Agreement	to	take	into	account	the	imperatives	of	a	just	transition.	The	Polish	government	usefully	highlighted	this	concern	with	its	promotion	of	a	ministerial	just	transition	declaration.	The	probably	most	prominent	related		
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initiative	at	national	level	currently	is	the	“Green	New	Deal”	initiative	in	the	US	spearheaded	by	Representative	Ocasio-Cortez.	At	the	same	time,	the	multiple	benefits	of	ambitious	climate	policy	should	be	put	more	into	the	spotlight.	The	World	Health	Organisation	reported	in	Katowice	that	the	health	savings	alone	could	compensate	more	than	twice	the	mitigation	costs	of	achieving	the	2°C	limit.	Another	item	to	consider	is	that	opportunities	and	barriers	vary	strongly	among	sectors.	For	example,	while	loss	of	competitiveness	is	a	strong	concern	in	some	energy-intensive	industries,	it	is	hardly	an	issue	in	other	sectors.	It	is	therefore	recommendable	to	focus	more	on	the	specific	needs	of	the	individual	sectors.69	Future	COPs	could	contribute	to	introducing	a	sectoral	perspective	to	climate	policy.	
5. The End of the COP as We Know It? With	the	adoption	of	comprehensive	implementation	guidelines	for	the	Paris	Agreement,	the	process	of	regime	building	has	finally	come	to	an	end	after	decades	of	negotiations.	This	raises	the	question	what	function	the	COP	may	perform	in	the	future.	Part	of	its	capacity	will	be	consumed	by	implementing	and	overseeing	the	broad	array	of	mechanisms	that	have	been	established,	from	transparency	to	finance.	But	arguably	the	main	part	of	the	capacity	that	has	now	been	freed	up	should	be	spent	focusing	on	the	core	task	at	hand:	raising	ambition.	Future	COPs	could	contribute	to	this	task	in	a	number	of	ways:	Exchange	and	mutual	learning:	The	UNFCCC	document	repository	contains	a	treasure	trove	of	knowledge	on	climate	policy,	which	has	so	far	hardly	been	utilised.	Countries	are	required	to	report	on	the	implementation	and	expected	impact	of	their	national	policies	in	their	national	communications.	Going	forward,	future	COPs	could	be	dedicated	to	sharing	lessons	learned	and	supporting	each	other	in	policy	implementation.	Broadening	outreach:	Despite	the	high	public	profile	of	the	issue,	in	national	governments	climate	policy	is	still	often	a	matter	only	for	the	environment	ministries	and	not	relevant	in	the	decisions	of	other	ministries.	However,	the	decisions	that	determine	countries’	future	emission	pathways	are	mostly	taken	in	the	energy,	transport	and	other	ministries,	not	in	the	environment	department.	The	COPs	should	therefore	endeavour	to	mobilise	participation	of	these	ministers	in	order	to	discuss	how	to	transform	their	respective	sectors.	There	might	also	be	a	good	case	for	the	establishment	of	a	more	permanent	function	of	the	COP	–	following	to	some	extent	the	example	of	the	General	Agreement	of	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT)	that	later	became	the	World	Trade	Organisation.	There,	the	regular	meetings	of	country	representatives	were	transformed	into	a	standing	body	that	was	able	to	react	to	the	continuing	demands	for	fast	reaction	and	regulation	of	the	world’s	trade	affairs.	To	sum	up,	the	Conferences	of	the	Parties	should	from	now	on	assume	less	the	role	of	a	shipbuilder	and	instead	move	to	the	role	of	a	ship’s	captain.	The	boat	has	been	built,	equipped	with	the	relevant	parts	and	most	of	the	operational	rules	for	setting	the	sails.	Now	is	the	time	to	set	the	course	towards	an	effective	protection	of	our	civilization	from	the	risks	and	dangers	of	climate	change.	This	demands	to	foster	agreement	on	the	course	needed	to	reach	the	destination		
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set	out	in	the	Paris	Agreement	–	i.e.	to	increase	ambition	and	work	on	a	sustainable	and	just	transition.	And	finally,	those	members	of	the	crew	that	want	to	move	faster	may	decide	to	build	a	smaller	jollyboat	that	keeps	the	Paris	Agreement	as	the	platform	or	“mother	ship”	but	allows	for	more	ambition	and	may	even	serve	as	a	tugboat	in	a	calm	when	the	global	winds	are	still.	
